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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err in refusing to instil' 
the jury on >sser included offense of theft? 
2. ..,'; Liie trial court err i.n denying the defendant's 
motion to dismiss the burlgary charge? 
iii 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
vs. 
LAWRENCE PITTSf 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20290 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction and judgment 
against Lawrence Pitts for the offense of Burglary, a Felony 
of the Third Degree, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202 
(1953 as amended). A jury found him guilty following a trial 
which lasted September 25-26, 1984, in the Third Judicial 
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable Jay E. Banks, Judge, presiding. 
Statement of Facts 
On August 4, 1984, (Saturday) an envelope containing 
a bank statement and some blank checks were stolen from Handy 
Pantry at Fourth South and Twelfth West (T. 9). The statement 
and checks were taken during business hours from the employer's 
office in the rear of the business (T. 11,14,28). 
Two employees of Handy Pantry, Valerie Swaner and 
Creed Anderson, testified that they recalled seeing Lawrence 
Pitts, the appellant, in the store around 7:00 p.m. (T. 36,45, 
46). Ordena Longton, Lawrence's common-law wife, also 
testified that she, Lawrence, and a black woman went to Handy 
Pantry in Ordenafs yellow Datsun on Saturday afternoon (T 51, 
52). Ordena said she made a telephone call at a pay phone 
while Lawrence and the black woman went in Handy Pantry to 
get baby milk (T. 53). They later returned to the car, and 
Lawrence was in possession of an envelope similar to the one 
later identified as having been taken from Handy Pantry (T. 55). 
Lawrence took Ordena home and left in Ordenafs car 
because of an argument (T. 56)• Later that night, he went 
over to Sharon Spencer and Merna Norwick•s home to spend the 
night (T. 72,78,81). Sharon and Merna both testified that he 
had an envelope similar to the one taken from Handy Pantry 
(T. 73,81,82) . 
The next morning, after Lawrence left Sharon and 
Merna1s home, he was detained and questioned by the police 
regarding an alleged theft of money from Sharon Spencer (T. 
96,97,104-106). Ultimately, he was arrested on traffic 
warrants, and the police discovered a bank statement and 
blank checks in the glove compartment of Ordena's yellow 
Datsun (T. 93,98). After checking with Preston Tholen, the 
owner of Handy Pantry, the police verified that the statement 
and checks had been taken on Saturday from Handy Pantry, and 
Lawrence was charged with burglary (T. 100,101). 
At trial, after the state had rested its case, 
counsel for the defendant made a motion to dismiss based 
on the state's failure to establish a prima facie 
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case of burglary (T. 116). This motion was denied (T. 119). 
Later, counsel for Mr. Pitts requested that the jury be 
instructed on the lesser included offense of theft. The 
judge refused, and counsel took timely exception to this 
refusal (T. 166-67). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The first argument on appeal is that the trial court 
erred in refusing to give an instruction to the jury on the 
lesser included offense of theft. To be entitled to an instruc-
tion on a lesser included offense, the defendant need only 
show that there was some evidence which, if relied on by the 
jury to the exclusion of all other, would lead the jury to 
acquit the defendant of burglary and convict of theft. Mr. Pitts 
met this burden. The evidence showed that Hendy Pantry was 
open for business, the back door was open, the back room 
contained a bathroom, and the sign on the door may not have 
been visible to someone passing through. The jury may have 
relied on this evidence and concluded that Mr. Pitts was guilty 
of theft, but not of burglary. He should have been given a 
lesser included instruction on theft. 
The second issue presented on appeal is that the 
trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to dismiss 
the burglary charge. The state failed to establish a prima 
facie case. The overwhelming evidence was that the entire 
store was open to the public and therefore Mr. Pitts did not 
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make any unlawful entry. A building which is open to the public 
cannot be the subject of a burglary. Moreover, there was no 
evidence that at the time of the entry to the back room, there 
was an intent to steal. The state failed to make out a case of 
burglary sufficient to present to the jury. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE LESSER 
INCLUDED OFFENSE OF THEFT 
Defense counsel requested that an instruction be 
given to the jury on theft, a lesser included offense of 
burglary. The court refused this request, and Mr. Pitts was 
convicted of burglary (T. 166-67). 
The statutory test to determine whether one offense 
is the lesser included offense of another is articulated in 
Utah Code Ann. §76-1-402 (1953 as amended); 
(3). . .An offense is. . .included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same 
or less than all the facts required to 
establish the commission of the offense 
charged. 
Numerous cases have dealt with a defendant's right 
to instructions on a lesser included offense. In a recent 
Utah Supreme Court case, State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 
1983), appellant was convicted of burglary. He appealed, 
claiming error in the court's refusal to instruct on the 
offense of criminal trespass. This Court his con-
viction and discussed the importance of instructions on 
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lesser included offenses. The Court emphasized the benefit 
to the defendant in allowing the jury a less drastic alter-
native to convicting on the charged offense. 671 P.2d at 
156 citing Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 633, 100 S.Ct. 
2382, 2388 (1980). The Court also recognized the danger that 
jurors are more likely to convict if no lesser instruction 
is given because of the belief that the defendant is guilty 
of some crime. Id. at 156-57 citing Keeble v. United States, 
412 U.S. 205, 212-13, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 1997-98 (1973). 
The Court resolved much of the confusion which had 
existed regarding lesser included offenses. The Court decided 
whether to apply the "necessarily included offense" doctrine 
or an evidence-based analysis in determining when an instruction 
on a lesser included offense is warranted. The Court held that 
the "necessarily included offense" doctrine, the stricter of the 
two standards, applies only when it is the prosecutor seeking 
the instruction on a lesser included offense. But when it is 
the defendant who requests the instruction, an evidence-based 
analysis is employed. 
In State v. Brown, No. 18314 slip op. (Utah, November 29, 
1984), this Court, relying on State v. Baker, utilized the 
evidence-based analysis. Appellant, Mr. Brown, requested an 
instruction on the lesser included offense of assault. This 
request was denied, and he was convicted of aggravated kidnap-
ping. The Court held this to be error and analyzed the defense 
request based on a two-part test developed in Baker. The first 
prong of the test, the Court noted, requires an overlap of 
the statutory elements of the two offenses. The second prong 
of the evidence-based standard requires that some evidence must 
allow for acquittal on the offense charged and conviction on 
the lesser offense. Id., at 3. 
Using the Baker and Brown analysis, the first step 
requires a comparison of the statutory elements of the offense 
of which the appellant was convicted, burglary, and the elements 
of the requested lesser offense of theft. The pertinent 
statutory elements of theft and burglary are: 
Theft—Elements.—A person commits theft 
if he obtains or exercises unauthorized 
control over the property of another with 
a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (1953 as amended). 
Burglary. (1) A person is guilty of 
burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully 
in a building or any portion of a building 
with intent to commit a felony of theft or 
commit an assault on any person. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202 (1953 as amended). 
The burglary statute proscribes the unlawful entry 
into a building with the intent to commit a felony or theft. 
Theft proscribes the unauthorized control over the property 
of another with the intent to deprive. If the actor commits 
a theft, the statutory elements clearly overlap. Indeed, 
the greater offense will not ordinarily be accomplished without 
the commission of the lesser, for it is the exercise of unau-
thorized control over the property which gives rise to the 
-6-
inference that the actor's entry was with the intent to steal. 
The statutory overlap in the context of this case is direct. 
The second step in the evidence-based analysis is 
to consider whether "there is some evidence at trial that, 
if believed by the jury, would provide a 'rational basis for 
a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and 
convicting him of the included offense. I,f State v. Brown at 3. 
In State v. Chesnut, 621 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1980), this Court 
stated the test as follows: 
This Court mandates giving defendant's 
requested instructions on the lesser 
offense if "any evidence, however slight, 
on any reasonable theory of the case" 
might lead to conviction on the lesser 
included offense. Id., at 1232. 
The jurors, in reaching a verdict, were required to 
apply the facts to the legal instructions given them. Included 
in these instructions were the following: 
Burglary.—(1) A person is guilty of burglary 
if he enters or remains unlawfully in a building 
or any portion of a building with intent to 
commit a felony or theft or commit an assault 
on any person. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202 (1953 as amended). 
Definitions.—For the purposes of this part: 
(1) "Building," in addition to its ordinary 
meaning, means any watercraft, aircraft, trailer, 
sleeping car, or other structure or vehicle 
adapted for overnight accommodation of persons 
or for carrying on business therein and 
includes: 
(a) Each separately secured or occupied 
portion of the structure or vehicle and 
(b) Each structure appurtenant to or 
connected with the structure or vehicle. 
* • • 
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(3) A person "enters or remains unlawfully" 
in or upon premises when the premises or 
any portion thereof at the time of the 
entry or remaining are not open to the 
public and when the actor is not otherwise 
licensed or privileged to enter or remain 
on the premises or such portion thereof. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-201 (1953 as amended). 
In applying the legal definition of an "unlawful 
entry" to the evidence, the jury may well have concluded that 
Mr. Pitts was guilty of a theft rather than a burglary. The 
evidence was uncontroverted that Handy Pantry was open to the 
public when the checks were taken. The store was in full 
operation, during business hours, and several other customers 
were present (T. 46). Moreover, the door to the back room was 
wide open (T. 14). The door was ordinarily kept open unless 
someone was working in the back room (T. 13). The cardboard 
sign which said "Employees Only, Others will be prosecuted" 
was on the inside of the door and was visible, if at all, only 
as one passed through the doorway (T. 13). The manager of the 
store testified that the storefs only bathroom and a sandwich-
making area were in the back room (T. 15,22) . 
Clearly, the jury had a factual basis on which to 
conclude the entry was lawful. The jury may well have concluded 
that Mr. Pitt's entry was "licensed" where the Handy Pantry 
was open for business and the back room was wide open. They 
may have concluded that Mr. Pitts was merely guilty of 
wandering to the bathroom and stealing checks along the way. 
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Since no evidence was presented by the state from 
which the jury could infer that Mr. Pitts knew the location 
of the checks or otherwise had a scheme or design to steal 
the checks, the inferences must be drawn from the physical 
layout of the store and the attendant circumstances of the 
theft, including time of day, habits of convenience store 
customers, etc. 
It is enough that there was some evidence, "however 
slight, on any reasonable theory of the case under which 
Mr. Pitts [might have been] convicted of [the] lesser included 
offense." State v. Chesnut, 621 P.2d at 1232. A rational 
basis existed to acquit the defendant of burglary and convict 
him of theft. Under these circumstances, the trial court must, 
if requested, instruct on the lesser included offense. Id. 
It was reversible error for the trial court to refuse the 
requested instruction of theft as a lesser included offense. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
THE BURGLARY CHARGE 
At trial, counsel for Mr. Pitts made a motion to 
dismiss the burglary charge. The motion was made immediately 
after the state rested its case and was based on the state's 
failure to present facts supporting a prima facie case of 
burglary as a matter of law (T. 116). The motion was denied 
(T. 119) . 
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This Court, in State v. Asayy 631 P.2d 861, 864 
(Utah 1981) defined "prima facie evidence" as ,f[s]uch evidence 
as, in the judgment of the law is sufficient to establish a 
given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting the 
party's claim or depose, and which if not rebutted or contra-
dicted, will remain sufficient." The state must meet this 
burden regarding both the mens rea and the actus reas require-
ments in the statute. The statutes pertinent to this issue 
are: 
Burglary.—(1) A person is guilty of 
burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully 
in a building or any portion of a building 
with intent to commit a felony or theft 
or commit an assault on any person. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202 (1953 as amended). 
Definitions.—For the purposes of this 
part: 
(1) "Building," in addition to its 
ordinary meaning, means any watercraft, 
aircraft, trailer, sleeping car, or other 
structure or vehicle adapted for overnight 
accommodation of persons or for carrying 
on business therein and includes: 
(a) Each separately secured or occupied 
portion of the structure or vehicle; and 
(b) Each structure appurtenant to or 
connected with the structure or vehicle. 
. . . 
(3) A person "enters or remains unlaw-
fully" in or upon premises when the premises 
or any portion thereof at the time of the 
entry or remaining are not open to the 
public and when the actor is not otherwise 
licensed or privileged to enter or remain 
on the premises or such portion thereof. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-201 (1953 as amended). 
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It is clear that the state must provide prima facie 
evidence regarding both the act (unlawful entry) and the 
intent (to commit theft at the time of the entry). The state 
must show that Mr. Pitts entered the back room of the building 
unlawfully and that, at the time of the entry, Mr. Pitts had 
the intent to commit a felony or theft. 
Several cases have held, as a matter of law, that 
entry into areas open to the public cannot be "unlawful." 
See State v. Taylor, 522 P.2d 499 (Or. App. 1974) (finding 
that the issue as to whether an apartment laundry room was 
open to the public should have been presented to the jury to 
decide), Macias v. People, 421 P.2d 116 (Colo. 1966) (holding 
that a telephone booth was open and invited business from the 
public and therefore could not be the subject of a burglary), 
State v. Ruiz, 617 P.2d 160 (N.M. App. 1980) (holding that 
burglary of a dwelling house required unauthorized entry into 
the dwelling house). 
In this case, Mr. Pitts submits, the state 
failed to present prima facie evidence that he committed the 
act of unlawfully entering the back room of the building. 
At trial, there was testimony that Mr. Pitts 
and a woman companion were shopping at the Handy Pantry the 
day the theft occurred (T. 45). But the state produced no 
witnesses who saw Mr. Pitts in the back room, nor any witnesses 
who saw Mr. Pitts enter or exit the back room. Furthermore, 
the Handy Pantry was at the time open to the public and, as 
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in Macias v. People, supra, openly invited the business of 
the public. The door to the back room was open, and the store's 
bathroom was located in this back room. Even if Mr. Pitts 
had entered this back room (which, as stated above, there was 
no evidence of), unless it was clear that this portion of the 
store, necessarily including the bathroom, was off limits to 
the public, then entrance was not unlawful. Because the sign 
on the door was not facing outward towards the store, it 
afforded no such reasonable notice. 
Utah has extensive case law on the burglary intent 
requirement. In State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 881 (Utah 
1981), this Court stated that the intent to commit a felony, 
theft, or assault must be proven, or circumstances must be 
shown from which the intent may reasonably be inferred. It 
is recognized that because intent is a state of mind, it 
is rarely susceptible to direct proof. Therefore, the intent 
to steal while unlawfully entering the building can be inferred 
by the conduct and the circumstances presented at trial, in 
light of human experience. 
Thus, in State v. Sisneros, 631 P.2d 856, 859 (Utah 
1981), this Court held that "[w]hen one breaks and enters 
a building in the nighttime, without consent, an inference 
may be drawn that he did so to commit larceny." Other acts 
sufficient to raise this inference of intent include a showing 
that the defendant entered an apartment by ladder at night 
and fled when officers arrived, leaving his car behind, 
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State v. Hopkins, 11 Utah 2d 363, 359 P.2d 486 (Utah 1961), 
and where the defendant is caught in a closed store at night 
near the store's safe with a drill and drill bits, People v. 
Morton, 4 Utah 407, 11 P. 512 (Utah 1886). See also State v. 
Syddall, 20 Utah 2d 73, 433 P.2d 10 (Utah 1967) (nighttime 
breaking and entering raises inference of intent), State v. 
Tellay, 7 Utah 2d 308, 324 P.2d 490 (Utah 1958) (nightime 
breaking and entering raises inference), and State v. Evans, 
279 P. 950 (Utah 1929) (same). 
If there was prima facie evidence that Mr. Pitts 
entered unlawfully into an area not open to the public, the 
state must still prove that he entered with the requisite 
intent to commit theft or other felony. As the cases cited 
point out, this intent can be inferred if evidence of conduct 
or circumstances is presented making such an inference 
reasonable. But no such evidence was presented. Unlike 
the cases cited regarding inferences of intent, the defendant 
here was not caught in the back room. Nobody saw him enter 
or leave the back room, either. There were no tools or 
instruments entered into evidence. There was no evidence 
of a plan or scheme to commit theft, such as testimony, 
accomplices, etc. 
Because of the state's failure to provide prima facie 
evidence as to an unlawful entry into the back room by Mr. Pitts 
and the state's failure to provide prima facie evidence as to the 
existence of an intent to commit theft at the time of the entrance 
into the back room, the court erred in denying the motion for 
dismissal. 
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CONCLUSION 
For all or any of these reasons, Lawrence Pitts 
seeks reversal of his conviction or, in the alternative, 
dismissal of the charges against him. 
Respectfully submitted this /j day of 
February, 1985. 
- C C C 
NANCY BERGESON 
Attorney for Defendant 
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APPENDIX A 
REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
If the State has failed to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant entered or remained in the building 
with the intent to commit a theft, then you may consider the 
lesser and included offense of theft. 
L 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
-/ 
Before you may convict the defendant of the offense 
of Theft, a lesser included offense of Burglary, the State 
must prove each and every one of the following elements to 
your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt: 
1. That on or about August 4, 1984, defendant 
exercised unauthorized control over the property of Handy Pantry. 
2. With the intent to deprive Handy Pantry of the 
property. 
3. That all acts occurred in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah* 
If the State has proven each and every one of the 
foregoing elements to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable 
doubt, then it is your duty to convict defendant of the offense 
of Theft, a lesser and included offense of Burglary in the 
Information. 
APPENDIX B 
STATUTES 
76-1-402 CRIMINAL CODE 
criminal episode. State v. Ireland, 570 P. Collateral References. 
2<1 1206. Criminal LawC=>29. 
The unlawful takhig of a vehicle and 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law §9 (1 ) . 
the failure to stop at the command of a 21 Am. Jur . 2d 88, Criminal Law § 8. 
police officer were two separate offenses, 
and not a single episode, where the two Law Reviews. 
offenses occurred a day apart and the crim- -gtah Legislative Survey—-1975, 1975 
inal objective in the unlawful taking was Utah L. Rev, 831. 
to obtain possession while the criminal ob-
jective in the failure to stop was to avoid 
arrest for a traffic violation. State v. Corn-
ish, 571 P. 2d 577. 
76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal episode— 
Included offenses.—(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single crim-
inal action for all separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; 
however, when the same act of a defendant under a single criminal episode 
shall establish offenses which may be punished in different ways under 
different provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable under only one 
such provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under any such 
provision bars a prosecution under any other such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single 
criminal episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a 
defendant shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court, and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time 
the defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the of-
fense charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and 
the included offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts 
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of prep-
aration to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included 
therein; or 
(c) I t is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included 
offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect 
to an included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquit-
ting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the in-
cluded offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an 
appellate court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insuf-
ficient evidence to support a conviction for the offense charged but that 
there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction for an included offense 
and the trier of fact necessarily found every fact required for conviction 
of that included offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set 
aside or reversed and a judgment of conviction entered for the included 
offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such relief is sought by the 
defendant. 
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OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY 76-6-201 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Animals. 
If accused's explanation and all circum-
stances showed he was an honest possessor 
of domestic animals, and had no criminal 
intent in placing his mark upon them, 
and no evidence was given to jury to 
show its falsity, he was entitled to an ac-
quittal. People v, Swazey, 0 U. 93, 21 P. 
400. 
On trial for altering and defacing wool 
brand on sheep, where one of defendants 
took no part in branding, evidence that he 
purchased paint for other defendant was 
not sufficient to justify court in submitting 
question of his guilt to jury. State v. 
Blank, 43 U. 211, 134 P. 735. 
Jury 's finding as to place of commission 
of crime of altering brands of sheep with 
intent to steal would not be disturbed in 
spite of defendant's uncontradicted evi-
dence that it was in another county 
where physical evidence as to where sheep 
had been ranging supported jury's finding. 
State v. McNaughtan, 92 U. 114, 6f> P. 2d 
137. 
Where alleged offense of branding ani-
mal with intent to steal it and accused's 
connection with offense rested wholly 
upon circumstantial evidence which, as 
matter of law, was reasonably consistent 
with innocence of accused, evidence was 
insufficient to support conviction; pur-
ported ownership of cow was based solely 
on witnesses' belief, based on way it was 
branded, though an owner's brand some-
times appeared on others' cattle, and only 
description of cow was that it was "spot-
ted."-State v. Burch, 100 U. 414, 115 P. 2d 
911. 
In prosecution for branding steer be-
longing to-another with intent, to steal it, 
question of intent to steal waj properly 
submitted to jury; even though there was 
evidence that no attempt had been made 
by anyone to obliterate owner's markings, 
that while steer's ear had been marked 
with defendant's slit, hole for ear tag was 
still present in ear, that owner's brand had 
been haired over, that steer was found in 
defendant's pasture contiguous to owner's 
property after having been missed for 
about seven months, and that fences were 
not in good state of repair. State v. Jar-
rctt, 112 U. 335, 187 P . 2d 547. 
Burglary. 
Where defendant was caught in act of 
peeling safe in closed supermarket, offense 
was burglary; court could not reasonably 
have given instructions on offense of un-
lawful entry with intent to damage, injure 
or annoy, and jury could not reasonably 
have found defendant guilty thereof, be-
cause his intent must have been something 
other than damaging property, or injuring 
or annoying a person. State v. Dodge, 18 
U. (2d) 03, 415 P. 2d 212. 
Common-law rule. 
Wanton and malicious injury or destruc-
tion of property belonging to another was 
indictable offense at common law. People 
v. Olsen, G U. 284, 22 P. 103. 
Larceny. 
Mere fact that property was destroyed 
maliciously and with intent to deprive 
owner permanently of its use did not 
constitute larceny, though defendant 
could be prosecuted under statute which 
described malicious mischief. State v. Al-
len, 50 U. 37, 189 P. 84. 
Malice. 
Malice against owner of property was 
essential ingredient of crime of malicious 
mischief, and must have been alleged and 
proved to sustain conviction; where two 
persons drove past premises of owner of 
pig, and one shot at pig, wounding and 
maiming it, malice could be inferred 
though defendant did not know owner 
of pig. Territory v. Olsen, 6 U. 284, 22 P. 
103. 
Malicious injury to railroad property. 
Information which charged that de-
fendant displaced part of railroad by fe-
loniously parting air hose and closing 
angle cocks on train of cars was subject 
to defendant's objection that it did not 
sufficiently appear therefrom that train of 
cats referred to was "attached to or con-
nected with any railroad" and was pro-
pelled bv steam or other motive power. 
State v /McKenna , 24 U. 317, 07 P. 815. 
Part 2 
Burglary and Criminal Trespass 
76-6-201. Definitions.—For the purposes of this par t : 
(1) "Building," in addition to its ordinary meaning, means any water-
craft, aircraft, trailer, sleeping car, or other structure or vehicle adapted 
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for overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying on business therein 
and includes: 
(a) Each separately secured or occupied portion of the structure or 
vehicle; and 
(b) Each structure appurtenant to or connected with the structure or 
vehicle. 
(2) "Dwelling" means a building which is usually occupied by a person 
lodging therein at night, whether or not a person is actually present. 
(3) A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in or upon premises 
when the premises or any portion thereof at the time of the entry or re-
maining are not open to the public and when the actor is not otherwise 
licensed or privileged to enter or remain on the premises or such portion 
thereof. 
(4) "Enter" means: 
(a) Intrusion of any part of the body; or 
(b) Intrusion of any physical object under control of the actor. 
Collateral Eef erences. 
Burglary€=5l. 
Cross-References. 1 2 CJ .S . Burglary § !._ 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-201, enacted by 
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-201. 
Civil provisions, entry and detainer, 78-
36-1. 
13 Am. Jur . 2d 320, Burglary § 1. 
76-6-202. Burglary.—(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters 
or remains unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with 
intent to commit a felony or theft or commit an assault on any person. 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed 
in a dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second degree. 
History: O. 1953, 76-6-202, enacted by 
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-202. 
Cross-References. 
Agreement to commit burglary, conspir-
acy, 76-4-201. 
Lesser included offenses. 
I t was not error for the court, at trial 
of defendant on a charge of attempted 
burglary, to refuse to instruct the jury on 
the offense of possession of an instrument 
for burglary or theft, as defined by 76-6-
205, since that offense was not necessarily 
embraced within the crime of burglary. 
State v. Sunter, 550 P . 2d 184. 
CoUateral References. 
Burglary<§=>9(2). 
12 C.J.8. Burglary § 10. 
13 Am. Jur . 2d 326, Burglary § 10. 
Breaking and entering of inner door of 
building as burglary, 43 A. L. R. 3d 1147. 
Burglary without breaking, 23 A. L. R. 
288. 
Criminal prosecution based upon break-
ing into or taking money or goods from 
vending machine or other coin-operated 
machine, 45 A. L. E. 3d 1286. 
Larceny, conviction or acquittal of as 
bar to prosecution for burglary, 19 A. L. R. 
626. 
Maintainability of burglary charge, 
where entry into building is made with 
consent, 93 A. L. R. 2d 531. 
Necessity and sufficiency of allegations 
in indictment or information for burglary 
as to value of property intended to be 
stolen which would make its theft a 
felony, 113 A. L. R. 1269. 
Opening closed but unlocked door as 
breaking which will sustain charge of bur-
glary or breaking and entering, 23 A. L. R. 
112. 
Vacancy or nonoccupancy of building as 
affecting its character as a "dwelling" as 
regards burglary, 85 A. L. R. 428. 
What is a "building" or "house" within 
burglary statutes, 78' A. L. R. 2d 778. 
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History: C. 1953, 76-6-40r enacted by 
L. 1973, ch. 196, §76-6-403; J 1974, ch. 32, 
§17. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1974 amendment substituted "sec-
tions 76-6-404 through 76-6-410" for "sec-
tions 76-6-403 through 76-6-411." 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-404, enacted by 
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-404, 
Cross-References. 
Motor vehicles special anti-theft laws, 
41-1-105 to 41-M21. 
Shoplifting Act, 78-11-14 et seq. 
Comment of defendant's silence. 
"Where defendant charged with theft of 
building materials from construction site 
did not testify in his own defense and 
offered no evidence to explain his late-
night presence at the site, prosecutor's 
comment tha t : "The defense has presented 
no evidence as to why defendant was out 
there. What was he doing out there?" was 
Theft out of state. 
Utah court had jurisdiction to t ry 
defendants on charge of grand larceny 
where defendants stole car in Texas and 
drove it to Utah. Conners v. Turner, 29 U. 
(2d) 311,508 P. 2d 1185. 
Uncorroborated explanation of possession. 
Evidence was sufficient to support con-
viction for grand larceny where recently 
stolen pistol was found in car in which 
defendant was riding and where de-
fendant's claim that he purchased pistol 
several months earlier in bar was not sup-
ported by either direct or circumstantial 
evidence. State v. Pappacostas, 17 U. (2d) 
197, 407 P. 2d 576. 
Receiving stolen property. 
Evidence which establishes receiving 
stolen property under section 76-6-408 is 
sufficient to sustain a conviction of theft 
without the necessity of establishing theft 
by taking. State v. Taylor, 570 P. 2d 697. 
Collateral References. 
Single or separate larceny predicated 
upon stealing property from different own-
ers at the same time, 28 A. L. R. 2d 1182. 
' a legitimate comment on what the total 
evidence did or did not show; it was not 
impermissible comment on defendant's 
failure to testify. State v. Kazda, 540 P . 
, 2d 949. 
Elements of offense. 
State is not required to prove conclu-
sively who the real owner of the property 
? is, but only that the defendant obtained or 
j exercised unauthorized control over the 
I propertv of another. State v. Simmons, 
 573 P. "2d 341. * 
I Evidence establishing theft. 
t Evidence which establishes the receiv-
j ing of stolen property under section 76-6-
76-6-403. Theft—Evi nee to support accusation.—Conduct denomi-
nated theft in this part v nstitutes a single offense embracing the separate 
offenses such as those In otofore known as larceny, larceny by trick, lar-
ceny by bailees, embezzle uent, false pretense, extortion, blackmail, receiv-
ing stolen property. An cusation of theft may be supported by evidence 
that it was committed in my manner specified in sections 76-6-404 through 
76-6-410, subject to the p< ver of the court to ensure a fair trial by granting 
a continuance or other ppropriate relief where the conduct of the de-
fense would be prejudiced by lack of fair notice or by surprise. 
76-6-404. Theft—Elements.—A person commits theft if he obtains or 
exercises unauthorized control over the property of another with a purpose 
to deprive him thereof. 
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History: C; 1953, 76-6-410, enacted by 
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-410. 
Compiler's Notes. 
This section did not contain a subsec. 
(2). 
Collateral References. 
Larceny<§=>15. 
52A C.J.S. Larceny §§ 46, 47. 
50 Am. Jur . 2d 263, Larceny § 89. 
Liability of bailee for hire of automo-
bile for loss of, or damage to, contents, 27 
A. L. R". 2d 796. 
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Failure to return rented property. 
Where rented typewriter was not re-
turned by defendant after rental period 
despite repeated demands by owner, court, 
sitting without a jury, was not required to 
believe defendant's testimony that he 
gave typewriter to his business partners 
to return, since partners were not called to 
corroborate his story, and defendant con-
veniently forgot important details. State 
v. Knepper, 18 U. (2d) 215, 418 P. 2d 780. 
Evidence supported conviction of em-
bezzlement, where defendant had been 
given permission to continue to use car 
on somewhat open-ended contract after 
initial rental period had expired, but de-
fendant failed to return car on specific 
date on which he was finally told that he 
must return it. State v. Heemer, 26 U. 
(2d) 309, 489 P. 2d 107. 
Willfullncss. 
"Willfully" required only that accused 
be aware of act charged and that he con-
sciously desired to do it, or at least was 
willing that it be done; to show "willfull-
ness," it was not necessary that there be 
an intent to violate law, to injure another, 
or to acquire any advantage. State v. 
Knepper, 18 U. (2d) 215, 418 P . 2d 780. 
76-6-411. Repealed, 
Repeal 
Section 76-6-411 (C. 1953, 76-6-411, en-
acted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-411), re-
lating to theft by failure to make required 
payment or disposition of property subject 
to legal obligation, was repealed by Laws 
1974, ch. 32, §41. 
76-6-412. Theft—Classification of offenses—Action for treble damages 
against receiver of stolen property.—(1) Theft of property and services 
as provided in this chapter shall be punishable as follows: 
(a) As a felony of the second degree if: 
(i) The value of the property or services exceeds $1,000; or 
(ii) The property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle; or 
(iii) The actor is armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the theft; 
or 
(iv) The property is stolen from the person of another. 
(b) As a felony of the third degree if: 
(i) The value of the property or services is more than $250 but not 
more than $1,000; or 
(ii) The actor has been twice before convicted of theft of property or 
services valued at $250 or less; or 
(iii) When the property taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cow, 
heifer, steer, ox, bull, calf, sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, or poultry. 
(c) As a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was 
more than $100 but does not exceed $250. 
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(d) As a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was 
$100 or less. 
(2) Any person who has been injured by a violation of subsection 
(1), of section 76-6-408 may bring an action against any person mentioned 
in (d) for three times the amount of actual damages, if any sustained by 
the plaintiff, costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-412, enacted by 
L. 1973, ch. 196, §76-6-412; L. 1974, eh. 
32, § 18; 1975, ch. 48, § 1; 1977, ch. 89, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1974 amendment substituted "$250" 
for "$100" in items ( l ) ( b ) ( i ) , ( l ) ( b ) ( i i ) 
and subd. ( l ) ( c ) ; substituted "$100" for 
"$50" in subds. ( l ) ( c ) and ( l ) ( d ) ; and 
substituted "class B misdemeanor" for 
"class C misdemeanor" in subd. ( l ) ( d ) . 
The 1975 amendment added item ( l ) ( b ) 
(ii i); and made a minor change in style. 
The 1977 amendment added "swine, or 
poultry" to item (1) (b) (i i i) . 
Cross-References. 
Description of money, 77-21-23. 
Person convicted of theft of livestock 
liable in civil action, 4-13-19.7. 
Right to be tried and sentenced by 
judge who is member of Utah bar, 78-5-4. 
Valuation of stolen property. 
For purposes of determining the degree 
of an offense graded in terms of the value 
of the property stolen, the proper measure 
Construction and application. 
Grand larceny included offense of petty 
larceny. State v. Lawrence, 120 U. 323, 234 
P. 2d 600. 
Burglary. 
One who entered garage with intent to 
steal and stole automobile worth sufficient 
amount to constitute crime of grand lar-
ceny was properly convicted of both third 
degree burglary and grand larceny. Roger-
son v. Harris, 111 U. 330, 178 P. 2d 397. 
Information. 
If information for grand larceny suf-
ficiently stated crime of grand larceny, 
motion in arrest of judgment would be 
denied. State v. Hartman, 101 TJ. 298, 119 
P. 2d 112. 
Instructions. 
It was reversible error to omit to in-
struct as to amount of debt owing by de-
fendant on auto, left for repairs, but taken 
and driven away without satisfying lien 
existing on car; if jury had found that 
is the cm rent market value of the property 
at the tiine and place where the alleged 
offense was committed. State v. Logan, 
563 P. 2d 811. 
Collateral References. 
LarccnyC=>23. 
52A C.J.S. Larceny §60(1) . 
50 Am. Jur. 2d 208, Larceny § 44. 
Constitutionality of statute for preven-
tion of larceny of livestock, 3 A. L. R. 81. 
Criterion of value for purpose of fixing 
degree of larceny of automobile license 
plates, 48 A. L. R. 1167. , 
Degree of crime as affected by question 
whether larceny predicated upon stealing 
property from different owners at the same 
time constitutes single or separate larceny, 
28 A. L. R. 2d 1182. 
Distinction between larceny and embez-
zlement, 146 A. L. R. 532. 
Fixed or controlled price as affecting 
value of goods for purpose of determining 
degree of larcony, 157 A. L. R. 1303. 
debt was less than $50, conviction for 
grand larceny would have been error. 
State v. Parker, 104 TJ. 23, 137 P. 2d 626. 
In prosecution for larceny of suitcase, 
refusal to give instruction that jury was 
justified in drawing unfavorable presump-
tion from prosecution's failure to intro-
duce suitcase and articles contained there-
in as best evidence of value was not 
error. State v. Campbell, 116 U. 74, 208 P. 
2d 530. 
On appeal from conviction for grand 
larceny, instruction on definition of grand 
larceny which included part of definition 
of robbery, and which failed to call jury's 
attention to portion of statute relative to 
value of property taken did not constitute 
prejudicial error, where jury could not 
have found under evidence that amount 
taken was not greatly in excess of $50. 
State v. Petralia, 118 U. 171, 221 P . 2d 
873. 
Jurisdiction of justice of the peace. 
After justice of peace had sentenced de-
fendant to jail and to pay fine for convic-
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